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Louisiana civilians can both lament and revere the power of their judges to
suspend prescription on the authority of an abbreviated Latin gloss.' The contra
non valentem doctrine has become a codifier's nightmare, abrogated by Civil
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I would like to thank Professor Vernon V. Palmer of Tulane University for guiding and inspiring my
research. I would also like to thank Professor Shael Herman and Professor Emeritus Rodolfo Batiza,
both of ulane University, for their assistance with the study of Roman law. Thanks also to
Professor Dennis Kehoe of Tulane University for his help in translating Oratian and Professor
Joachim Zekoll of Tulane University for translating and explaining portions of the Mflnchener
Kommentar of the BOB. Finally, I would like to thank Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos of Tulane
University for explaining provisions of the Greek Civil Code. This Article is dedicated to Piofessor
Bruce W. Frier of the University of Michigan, who in 1986 chose to teach an undergraduate course
on Cicero's de re Publica, although his students had registered for Imperial Prose.
Cicero's theory of a natural law beyond legislation, as contained in de Legibus, provides a
fortuitous backdrop for a discussion of Louisiana's extra legem doctrine of contra non valentem.
Therefore, all headings in this Article are fragments of de Legibus,'which are expanded in the
accompanying footnotes. As an advocate outside the circle of controlling jurists, Cicero himself
might have argued in favor of a notion of contra non valentem derived from principles of natural
justice if he saw the need.
1. Edward Livingston himself vehemently opposed any grant of equity powers to Louisiana's
judges. See Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A Functional
View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 7, 14-18 (1994). Nearly two centuries later, Palmer
finally called for the recognition of the "inherent equity function" that had developed by judicial
accretion. See id. at 23-24. In the interim, the Louisiana judge has performed triple duty as praetor,
iudex, and jurist, responsible for preserving and developing, while applying, Louisiana's civilian
tradition.
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Code article 3467, and affirmed by a nonauthoritative comment to the article.2
Unsure of neither its analytic place,3 nor of its proper extent, nor even of its
origin,4 contra non valentem is used by Louisiana judges when they are
overwhelmed by the injustice of an impossibly short prescriptive period to
engage in a little judicial legislation.S
2. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 3467 ("Prescription rins against all persons unless exception
is established by legislation.") with La. Civ. Code art. 3467 cmt. d ("Despite the clear language of
Article 3521 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, courts have, in exceptional circumstances, resorted
to the maxim contra non valentem non currit praescrpto. This jurisprudence continues to be
relevant." (citations omitted)). See Symeon C. Symeonides, One Hundred Footnotes to the New Law
of Possession and Acquisitive Prescription, 44 La. L. Rev. 69, 139 n.109 (1983). Symeonides noted
the "analytical problem" that comments are not part of the law. Professor Vernon V. Palmer
described this analytical problem further:
In a Revision without repeal, the Comments are forced to play an expanded, almost
"magical role." They must do more than explain the mechanics of the new provision, or
state the underlying theory or intent behind the provision, or issue that often inaccurate
assurance that the new article "does not change the law." The comments to this Revision
are forced to arrogate to themselves the power to eliminate the provisions of the 1870
Code that are unnecessary and the power to indicate which line of jurisprudence is
eliminated, preserved, or still "relevant." Comments possessing such powers should be
regarded as magic wands. They defy every law in the juridical universe.
Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code-The Birth of a Digest, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 221, 258-62 (1988).
Despite this problem, according to Palmer, "[c]learly this comment can only mean that contra non
valentem is retained regardless of what the Code says." Id. at 261. The Louisiana Supreme Court
also reached this conclusion. See St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165, 1168
n.4 (La. 1987).
3. Courts occasionally mistakenly refer to contra non valentem as interruptive rather than
suspensive of prescription. See, e.g., Manion v. Pollingue, 524 So. 2d 25, 32.33 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988); see also La Plaque Corp. v. Chevron USA Inc., 638 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994)
(referring to both in the alternative). Analytical incongruity within the doctrine of contra non
valentem itself has been noted. See Bennett v. General Motors Corp., 420 So. 2d 531, 536 (La. App,
2d Cir. 1982); see also E. Scott Hackenberg, Puttering About in a Small Land: Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5628 and Judicial Responses to the Plight of the Medical Malpractice Victim, 50 La. L.
Rev. 815, 824-25 (1990). It is difficult to conceive of the discovery category of contra non valentem
as suspensive because the undiscovered action remains unborn. See id. at 824. However, civilians
long ago discounted the distinction between an action suspended and an action unborn as of little
practical importance. See Marcel Planiol & George Ripert, 2(1) Treatise on the Civil Law no. 680,
at 368 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 1939).
4. Courts have been unsure whether contra non valentem is a civilian or common-law
hereditas. Compare Compeaux v. Plaisance Insp. & Ent., 639 So. 2d 434, 438 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1994) and Trujillo v. Boone, 539 So. 2d 894, 896 n.l (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (Barry, J., dissenting)
(civil law) with Shortess v. Touro Infirmary, 508 So. 2d 938, 943 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987) and
Bennett, 420 So. 2d at 537 (common law). On one occasion, the Louisiana Supreme Court bizarrely
used the abbreviated gloss to distinguish the Louisiana doctrine from a civilian ancestor, for which
the court used the full maxim. See Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305, 307 & n.4 (La. 1986). The
first circuit once stated that the doctrine was Roman while quoting a prior decision that referred to
its common-law origin. See Dagenhart v. Roberston Truck Lines, 230 So. 2d 916, 918-19 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1970) (quoting Kennard v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R., 190 So. 188, 190-91 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1939)).
5. See, e.g., Held v. State Farm Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993)
[Vol..56
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Contra non valentem appears to have originated as a gloss.6 Medieval
scholars, delighting in imposing harmony upon the dissonant chords of Roman
law, inferred the principle "prescription does not run against one who is unable
to act" from diverse Roman rules, which had governed, among others, the
exceptio doli et malus, dies utiles, and the restitutio in integrum. 7 During the
evolution of our generic consensual contract,8 contra non valentem likewise
became intertwined with expansive humanist notions of impossibility and will.
Contra non valentem was saved by the French judiciary from the revolutionary
guillotine of the Code Civil.' By the time of its invocation in Louisiana, contra
non valentem had been enshrined as a precept of natural law."0
Contra non valentem was first invoked by name in a reported Louisiana
appellate decision by Justice Frangois-Xavier Martin to suspend prescription for
a 120 day period during which the legislature had prohibited the commencement
of civil suits." Interestingly, the revolutionary codifier Edward Livingston,
as defendant's attorney, might have argued against the validity of contra non
valentem in Louisiana. Unfortunately, Livingston's arguments, although often
reported during this period, were not reprinted by Justice Martin in this case.' 3
("Here, the completely unrebutted evidence paints a sad picture of an abused young woman
struggling almost desperately to regain her human equilibrium while facing a most hostile family
environment.").
6. See G. Baudry-Lacantinerie & Albert Tissier, Prescription, in Trait6 Theorique et Pratique
de Droit Civil ch. 12, pt. 1, no. 367 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 1972). Bartolus glossed "Non valenti
agere non currit praescriptio." Id. at no. 367 n.2. Imerius had glossed more broadly "Praescription
non currit in his qui se velint agere non possunt." Id.
7. See Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, supra note 6, for a partial list of Roman rules linked
by the contra non valentem gloss. Id. at no. 367 n.2. These also include suspension for minority,
for public service as a physician, for absence on state business, for captivity, for active military duty,
for fulfillment of a condition precedent, and others. See Dig. 44.3.1; Cod. 6.60.1, 7.35.2-.4, -.6, -.8,
7.39.7.4.
8. On the difference between modem generic contract theory and Roman thoroughly nominate
contracts, see Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1615 (1992).
9. The redactors of the Code Civil intended that Article 2251 (Fr.), which parallels Louisiana's
Civil Code article 3467, be the end of contra non valentem. See Baudry-Lacantinerie & Tissier, supra
note 6, at no. 368. The French judiciary, however, preserved the doctrine by interpreting Article 2251
as not applying to external, objective incapacities. See id. at no. 369; see also Allain D. Favrot, The
Scope of the Maxim Contra Non Valentem in Louisiana, 12 Tul. L. Rev. 244, 244 n.3 (1938).
10. See, e.g., Rabel v. Pourciau, 20 La. Ann. 131, 131 (1868):
This Court has always considered the maxim, "Contra non valentein agere non currit
praescriptio," an axiom or first principle of natural law, and notwithstanding the terms of
limitation in prescription, contained in the old, as well as the new, Code, have (sic]
interpreted these terms in such a manner as to harmonize with this maxim of universal
justice.
11. See Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 609, 610-11 (La. 1817).
12. On Livingston as revolutionary codifier, see generally Mitchell Franklin, Concerning the
Historic Importance of Edward Livingston, 11 Tul. L. Rev. 163 (1937). On the life of Edward
Livingston, see generally William B. Hatcher, Edward Livingston: Jeffersonian Republican &
Jacksonian Democrat (1940).
13. According to the trial record, Livingston had asserted in the alternative that the debt had
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From this time, the doctrine gradually grew in Louisiana until abruptly killed by
the Civil War.14 Reconstructed," contra non valentem persisted despite benign
neglect as a disfavored 6 and ossified 7 doctrine. Finally, equity's jurist Justice
Albert Tate'" reinvigorated the doctrine of contra non valentem by formally
grafting upon it the discovery rule. 9
prescribed, it had been paid, or there had never been a debt. See Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs,
4 Mart. (o.s.) 609 (La. 1817) (Docket #190) (Rogers Collection, Archives and Manuscripts/Special
Collection Department, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans). Plaintiffs reply to
Livingston's first defense does not appear in the record. The trial judge seemed unmoved by
Livingston's pleas:
In this case all the circumstances go very far to show that the debt claimed if it ever really
existed, has been paid, yet they do not amount to such proof as ought to be required to
destroy a written evidence of a debt signed and acknowledged by the testator before a
Notary public. Wherefore it is ordered adjudged and decreed that the plaintiff recover of
the Defendants the sum of three thousand four hundred and fifty five dollars, with interest
thereon from the 20th June 1815 till paid together with costs of suit to be taxed.
Id. Based on this record, it appears that the appellate court may have suspended prescription via
contra non valentem sua sponte.
14. Smith v. Stewart, 21 La. Ann. 67 (1869). For discussion of the history of contra non
valentem in Louisiana, see Perrodin v. Clement, 254 So. 2d 704, 707-08 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971);
Palmer, supra note 1, at 64-68; Favrot, supra note 9, at 246-50.
15. Favrot speculated that changes in court personnel during the reconstruction era explains the
quick abolishment and reinstatement of contra non valentem. See Favrot, supra note 9, at 250 n.37.
Palmer challenges this traditional view. According to Palmer, the temporary disappearance of contra
non valentem was a political expediency, saving the court the trouble of ruling on the legality of
rebellious acts. See Palmer, supra note 1, at 67 n.250.
16. The courts, at least, perceived contra non valentem as disfavored. See, e.g., Israel v. Smith,
302 So. 2d 392, 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) ("On the contrary our study indicates that the doctrine
of contra non valentem has been given very limited application in Louisiana.'). On disfavored
doctrines, see Palmer, supra note 1, at 57-58.
17. Contra non valentem had become fixed in three categorical rules by the mid.nineteenth
century:
Where there was some cause which prevented the courts or their officers from acting
or taking cognizance of the plaintiff's action. A class of cases recognized by the Roman
law as proper for the allowance of the utile tempus ....
Where there was some condition or matter coupled with the contract or connected with
the proceeding which prevented the creditor from suing or acting ....
Where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from
availing himself of his cause of action.
Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730 (1856).
18. For a tribute to Justice Tate, see generally George W. Pugh, Jr., A Civilian for Our Times:
Justice Albert Tate, Jr., 47 La. L. Rev. 929 (1987).
19. Justice Tate enumerated and qualified a fourth category of contra non valentem:
Where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even
though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. (This principle will not except the
plaintiff's claim from the running of prescription if his ignorance is attributable to his own
willfulness or neglect; that is, a plaintiff will be deemed to know what he would by
reasonable diligence have learned.)
Corsey v. State Through the Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (La. 1979).
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I. EXSECRARI EUM, QUI UTILITATEM A IURE SEIUNXISSET 20
According to Cicero, Socrates rightly vilified him who first severed utilitas
from ius, believing that reason linked the two, and that in severance both must
perish.2 For both Cicero and Socrates, the reasonable rule was just and vice
versa.' In contrast, our doctrine of contra non valentem was secreted into a
perceived gap" between the reasonableness and fairness of prescriptive
legislation.' Despite Socratic protestations, this gap may be one aspect of law
that has truly existed from time immemorial.
25
20. Recteque Socrates exsecrari eum solebat, qui primus utilitatem a iure seiunxisset; id enim
querebatur caput esse exitiorwm omnium. Cicero, de Legibus I.xii.33-34.
21. See Cicero, de Legibus I.xii.33-34. Zimmermann, however, might disagree: "In primitive
communities, religion, law and morals are usually inextricably interwoven .... The disentanglement
of these ideas belongs to the latter and more refined stages of mental progress. It is a sign of the
specific legal genius of the Romans that they achieved this severance at a very early stage."
Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations 706-07 (1992).
22. Id. It might be better to say that for Socrates the most rational rule is the most just and
the least rational rule is the least just, but the function connecting those two points must be left to
your imagination. See Nicholas P. White, A Companion to Plato's Republic 225 (1979) (comparing
the happiness of the most and least just men).
23. On "gaps" in the law, see Palmer, supra note 1, at 36-42.
24. See, e.g., Bouterie v. Crane, 616 So. 2d 657 (La. 1993):
Contra non valentem was created by jurisprudence to soften the occasional harshness
of prescriptive statutes .... However, the principles of equity and justice, which form
the mainstay of the doctrine, demand that under certain circumstances prescription be
suspended because plaintiff was effectually prevented from enforcing his rights for reasons
external to his own will.
Id. at 660.
25. For example, it was found necessary in the Code of Hammurabi to adjust the law as follows:
If any owe a debt on which he pays interest, and a storm devastate his field and destroy
the grain, or, owing to a scarcity of water, the grain have not grown in the field; in that
year he need not give any grain to the creditor; he shall moisten his contract tablet in
water, and need pay no interest this year.
The Code of Hammurabi, in I Evolution of the Law: Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law 401
(Albert Kocourek & John H. Wigmore eds. 1915). This disjunction between law and justice is
probably as old as agriculture, with its dependence on environmental vagaries. Law and agriculture
seem intimately related in the Western tradition:
Ceres, the daughter of Saturn and Ops, taught mankind tillage, the worship of the gods, the
use and rights of separate property, respect to parents, and tenderness to animals: on this
account, both in the Greek and Latin writers, she is called the law-bearing Ceres; and both
in Greece and Rome, she was worshipped, and had temples dedicated to her under that name.
Charles Butler, Horm Juridict Subsecivie 2 (1808).
The ancient Greek institution of npo0ecptx is similar to. liberative prescription. John F. Charles,
Statutes of Limitations at Athens 1-4 (1938). Little is known about suspending npo0ealca,
although it is known that a claim by ward against guardian was suspended in ancient Athens until
the ward reached the age of majority. Id. at 7-9, 66-67.
We do know that Accursius took Ulpian's definition of law (as the art of the good and the
equitable) on its face. See Roger Simonds, Philosophy and Legal Traditions 5 (1973). Therefore,
Accursius concluded that usucapio fell into the category of good but not equitable. Id. at 6.
1995]
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From the shadowy religious origins of Roman law, in the division of days into
fasti and nefasti by pontiffs,26 the need for counting only those dies that were
utiles must have taken root. To require that a person obtain a formula from a
praetor tongue-tied on a dies nefasti was to require the legally impossible. Ely
counting only those days on which it was possible to enlist the help of a magistrate
toward the time available for performing certain legal acts,27 the praetor restored
both reason and fairness to Roman rules. This is the contra non valentem
envisioned by Justice Martin in 1817.28
Despite the undeserved Roman reputation for theoretical sterility, Ulpian
recognized that dies utiles, because they rested on the plaintiff s potestas, must also
exclude days of vis major, wartime captivity, and political absence. However, dies
utiles must include the day on which a plaintiff from his sickbed could have sent
an agent before the praetor.29 Ulpian's reliance on potestas not only expanded
26. First pontiffs, and later aediles, designated calendar days as nefasti, on which holidays no
legislative or judicial operations could occur. See Adolf Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman
Law 435-36 (1953).
27. See id. at 436.
28. See Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 609, 610-11 (La. 1817). Dies utiles
persist in codified form in Louisiana's procedural law. See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. art. 5059. Dies utiles
are also the solution of the modem canonist, who divides time into continuous and available: "§ 1.
Tempus continuum intellegitur quod nullam patitur interruptionem. § 2. Tempus utile intellegitur quod
ius suum exercenti aut persequenti competit, ut ignoranti aut agere non valenti non currat." Canon Law
Society of America, Codex luris Canonici c. 201 (1983). Reverend Ramstein explains:
Tempus utile is that which does not transpire for one who is ignorant of his rights, or
is unable to exercise or prosecute his rights; tempus continuum is that which suffers no
interruption for any cause.
In a case of doubt time must be presumed continuous; if tempus utile is intended the law
must expressly state that such is the case. The reason is that it is more in the nature of
time that it should run on without interruption.
Reverend Matthew Ramstein, A Manual of Canon Law 107-08 (1948). In canon law, available time
most often runs for a few days. See Canon Law Society of America, The Code of Canon Law: A
Text and Commentary 113 (1985); see also Codex luvis Canonici, supra at Canons 179, 1630, &
1734 (allowing available time to run in limitations periods of eight to fifteen days).
The notion of tempus utiles, like full-fledged contra non valentem, is prone to needless analytical
subdivision. See Anton F.J. Thibaut, An Introduction to the Study of Jurisprudence 82 (Nathaniel
Lindley trans., 1885) (dividing tempus utiles into tempus utile ratione initii et continuum ratione cursus,
tempus continuum ratione initii et utile ratione cursus, and tempus utile ratione initii et cursus).
29. Compare Dig. 44.3.1 (Ulpian) (emphasis added):
Quia tractatus de utilibus diebus frequens est, videamus, quid sit experiundi potestatem
habere. Et quidem in primis exigendum est, ut sit facultas agendi. Neque sufficit reo
experiundi secur facere potestatem, vel habere eum qui se idonee defendat, nisi actor
quoque nulla idonea causa impediatur experiri. Proinde sive apud hostes sit sive rei
publicae causa absit sive in vinculis sit aut si tempestate in loco aliquo vel in regione
detineatur, ut neque experiri neque mandare possit, experiundi potestatem non habet.
Plane is. qui valetudine impeditur, ut mandare possit, in ea causa est, ut experiundi
habeatpotestatem. Illud utique neminemfugit experiundi potestatem non habere eum, qui
praetoris copiam non habuit: proinde his dies cedunt, quibus ius praetor reddit.
with Ayres v. New York Life Ins. Co., 54 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. 1951) ("There is no merit in the
contention. To begin with, it is manifest that insured's illness afforded no excuse for the failure to
(Vol. 56
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dies utiles into something closer to medieval contra non valentem but also reminds
us of another Roman maxim, impossibilium nulla obligatio est. In Roman law,
objective impossibility resulting from impedimentum naturale might also invalidate
a stipulatio or an emptio-venditio.30
Even before liberative prescription became the Roman-law rule rather than the
exception, the Imperator must have found Roman limitations inconvenient.31
When his soldiers returned from campaign only to find their rights and property
evaporated, the Imperator must have felt the temptation to wield his waning power
to restore them. We know that the Republican praetor, relying on his own
imperium rather than on his iurisdictio, could grant the restitutio in integrum to
restore property lost not only by honorable soldiers but also minors, those absent,
and the victims of fraud and duress. 2 In fact, the praetor reserved the right to
grant the restitutio for any cause that satisfied his sense of justice and was not
prohibited by law." Later, the Emperor, as the ultimate source of imperium, took
it upon himself to dispense with prescription as needed in the pursuit ofjustice.'4
make timely legal demand on his behalf.').
30. Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 687-88.
31. On Roman limitations, see Roscoe Pound, I Readings in Roman Law § 27 (1914); see also
William L. Burdick, Principles of Roman Law 662 (1938). Emperor Theodosius 11 limited the life
of the residuary category of personal actions, which had previously been immortal, to thirty years.
Code Th. 4.14.1-.6 (Clyde Pharr trans., 1952). Theodosius suspended this prescription for minority.
Code Th. 4.14.3. The emperor explained the policy of his prescriptive period to a praetorian prefect
as follows:
For who can endure that suits shall be instituted which grandfathers and great-grandfathers
did not know about? ... What other so valid a defense will defeat a wicked litigator if
unlimited periods of time which have passed do not protect the defendant?
Code Th. 27.1. Theodosius was warning his prefect to make no exceptions. Code Th. 27.3.
Theodosius himself, however, proceeded to make another exception for Roman captives of the
Vandals. Code Th. 35.12.
32. See Andrew Borkowski, Textbopk on Roman Law 71, 139-40 (1994); see also Berger,
supra note 26, at 682.
33. Sheldon Amos, The History and Principles of the Civil Law of Rome 363 (1883). Ulpian
provides the language of the edict:
Si cuius quid de bonis, cum is metus aut sine dolo malo rei publicae causa abesset, inve
vinculis servitute hostiumque potestate esset: sive cuius actionis comm cui dies exisse
dicetur: item si quis quid usu suum fecisset, aut quod non utendo amisit, consecutus,
actioneve qua solutus ob id, quod dies eius exierit, cur absens non defenderetur, inve
vinculis esset, secumve agendi potestatem non faceret, aut cum eum invitum in ius vocari
non liceret neque defenderetur: cume magistratus de ea re appellatus esset sive cui pro
magistratu sine dolo ipsius action exempta esse dicetur earm rerum actionem intra
annum, quo primum de ea re experiundi potestas erit, item si qua alia muhi lusta causa
esse videbitur, in integrum restituam, quod eius per leges plebis scita senatus consulta
edicta decreta principum licebit.
Dig. 4.6.1 (Ulpian) (emphasis added).
34. It must be remembered that the restitutio in integrum itself had a prescriptive period, which
varied with the cause for restitution. See Amos, supra note 33, at 363-64; see also Borkowski, supra
note 32, at 71.
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A. Stultissimum: Existimare omnia lusta esse"
Although he may have believed all rational laws to be just, Cicero was not
so foolish as to expect all enacted legislation to be rational. When given, the
choice, the British Chancellor also preferred justice to its imperfect technical
execution in statutory form.3 As a result, Equity has had a convoluted and
uneasy relationship with statutes of limitations.
Common law, like Roman law, had tolerated some immortal actions." Ihe
earliest English statute of limitations was simply the designation of a noteworthy
cut-off date, such as a coronation, that would bar all claims arising under the
prior regime. 38  King Henry VIII created England's first true statute of
limitations with a fixed interval between the birth and death of a legal action.39
However, when statutes of limitations were legislatively extended to Equity, Lord
Redesdale had already conceded that they were to be applied by analogy.40
-Lord Redesdale, however, had allowed for one exception. When a defendant
was guilty of fraud, and a plaintiff free from laches, a statute of limitations
would not bar an equitable claim.4 When the administration of Equity and
Law were merged, the equitable exception was retained in those situations that
would have previously been within Equity's sole or concurrent jurisdiction. 2
35. Iam vero iUud stultissimum, existimare omnia iusta esse, quae sita sint populorun institutis
aut legibus. Cicero, de Legibus l.xv.42.
36. See William W. Billson, Equity in its Relations to Common Law 15-16 (1917).
Now Equity is nothing else but a Mitigation made of some Written Law, whereby we
follow and execute the Intention, Reason, and Will of the Law, upon a Discovery thereof,
by laying aside the stricter Letter of it, and having recourse to Natural Justice only: For
we do hereby remit the literal and grammatical Sense of it, and either restrain or extend
the same, as the Cause and different Circumstances thereof require.
John Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law 37 (1734).
37. See H.G. Wood, A Treatise on the Limitation of Actions at Law and in Equity 2-3 (1893).
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 4-5.
40. Id. at 110-12. According to Lord Redesdale:
But it is said that courts of equity are not within the statutes of limitations. This is true
in one respect; they are not within the words of the statutes, because the words apply to
particular legal remedies: but they are within the spirit and meaning of the statutes, and
have been always so considered.
I think, therefore, courts of equity are bound to yield obedience to the statute of
limitations upon all legal titles and legal demands, and cannot act contrary to the spirit of
its provisions.
Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 9 Rev. Rep. 119, 120 (1806). Later, the process of analogy was applied
in reverse to impose the requirement that a defendant be in esse before limitation could result. See
Murray v. East India Co., 1814-1823 All ER. 227, 232.
41. Wood, supra note 37, at 113-14.
42. See Earl of Halsbury, 19 The Laws of England 49 n.a (1911); see also Gibbs v. Guild, 51
L.J.R. 313, 316 (1882). According to Master Porter:
I quite agree that the same rules of law are now to be applied in all the Divisions of the
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Equity's jurisdiction over the exception stemmed from fraudulent concealment
of the cause of action.43 According to Lord Coleridge, Equity was simply
doing what it always had: restraining a particular defendant from exercising his
legal right while leaving the law intact."
By 1877, the equitable exception of fraudulent concealment was considered
settled for more than a century. Several other exceptions to the statute of
limitations, based on plaintiff's impeded potestas, had already been codified in
England by 1623.4 Ultimately, the fraudulent concealment rule was codified
in common-law jurisdictions as well.4'7  Equity's fraudulent concealment rule,
with all of its concomitant common-law impedimenta, remains the third category
of Louisiana's contra non valentem doctrine.'8
High Court, and that this action is to be dealt with in the Exchequer Division as it would
have been in the Chancery Division. But that is only another way of saying that if it had
been brought in the Chancery Division it must be dealt with as in the Exchequer Division.
Barber v. Houston, 18 L.R. Ir. 475, 477 (1885).
43. See, e.g., Blair v. Bromley, 16 L.J.R. 105, 111 (1846); see also Henry Ballow. A Treatise
of Equity 322 (John Fonblanque ed., 1979):
But though courts of equity will interpose, in order to prevent those mischiefs which
would probably result from persons being allowed, at any distance of time, to disturb the
possession of another, or to bring forward stale demands; yet, as its interference in such
cases proceeds upon principles of conscience, it will not encourage, nor in any manner
protect, the abuse of confidence; and therefore no length of time shall bar a fraud.
British judges were reminded to distinguish garden-variety fraud from fraudulent concealment of
the cause of action, both of which may occur in the same case. See Barber, 18 L.R. Ir. at 481-82.
Equity disregarded the statute of limitations only if the latter occurred. Id. There were three
rationales given for Equity's involvement: (1) the damage was not sustained until the defendant's
fraudulent plan to conceal the cause of action actually succeeded, (2) the fraudulent concealment "de
die in diem" gave rise to a fresh "terminus a quo" for the statute of limitation to begin daily anew,
and (3) personal estoppel. Id. at 479-8 1. Louisiana judges have also remarked on the similarity of
contra non valentem to estoppel. See Tassin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 310 So. 2d 680, 685-86 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975).
44. See Gibbs, 51 L.J.R. at 316.
45. Ecclesiastical Comm'rs v. North E. Ry., 47 L.J.R. 20, 26-27 (1877).
46. Halsbury, supra note 42, at 56 n.g. These included minority, insanity, coverture,
imprisonment, and maritime absence. Id.
47. See George V. Keeton & L.A. Sheridan, Equity 107-09 (3d ed. 1987). The equitable
exception has also been codified by civilians. See, e.g., 2 Codice civile art. 2941(8) (Italy); see also
Greek Civil Code art. 255.
48. See, e.g., Green v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 144 So. 2d 685,687 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
see also Stanbrough v. M'Call, 4 La. Ann. 322, 324 (1849) ("The rule that, he who thus paralyzes the
right of another shall not benefit by his own act to prescribe against that right, is not peculiar to our own
jurisprudence; but, as it has its foundation in reason and justice, we find it adopted as a principle of
equity in England and in the United States."); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Lynch, 633 So. 2d 212, 216 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1993) ("The use of contra non valentem, based on the factual situation envisoned by the
third category, requires a finding of fraudulent or intentional concealment or misrepresentation."). Most
often today courts make no real distinction between the third and fourth varieties of contra non valentem,
see, e.g., Doskey v. Hebert, 645 So. 2d 674, 680 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), or apply a hybrid of the two.
See, e.g., Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206,218 (La. 1994) (Kimball, J., concurring) (criticizing the
court for using the hybrid when the third variety alone would have sufficed).
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Civilians attempted to reign in their own contra non valentem through
codification. 9 Civilian legislators excused several plaintiff impotencies just as
the praetor had: the action must have been born (e.g. rent must -be due or a
suspensive condition fulfilled),50 potestas must have been impeded by lav (e.g.
in minority, coverture, or insanity),51 or potestas must have been impeded by
a legally excused fact (e.g. by absence).52 Civilian judges, however, would not
leave legislation to their legislators, preferring to preserve the uncodified judicial
contra non valentem as a way to suspend prescription when an unanticipated
need arose. 3
The common-law fraudulent concealment variant of contra non valentem was
similarly opposed from its inception. Foremost among the common-law
objections was the civilian fear of the equitable exception's threat to the statute's
well being.' While civilians tried to confine contra non valentem to their
49. A stricter fraudulent concealment variant of contra non valentem was also codified in
England by 1833. See Denis Browne, Ashbumer's Principles of Equity 507 (1933).
50. See Jean Domat, 1 The Civil Law no. 2215 at 880 (Luther S. Cushing ed., William Strahan
trans., 1861); see also Planiol & Ripert, supra note 3, no. 650, at 358; M. Pothier, 1 Law of
Obligations no. 645, at 351-52 (William D. Evans trans., 1839).
51. Domat, supra note 50, no. 2220, at 882-83.
52. Id. no. 2222, at 883-84.
53. See Planiol & Ripert, supra note 3, no. 678, at 368. Interestingly, once contra non
valentem was thoroughly codified in common-law jurisdictions, there was less tolerance of the
judicial precursor than in civil-law jurisdictions. "The general rule is, that whatever the courts may
think the legislature would have done if it had foreseen a certain contingency, nevertheless, a case
coming fairly within the limitation imposed by the statute cannot be excepted from its operation,
unless it also comes fairly within the exceptions named therein." Wood, supra note 37, at 9-10.
54. See, e.g., Imperial Gas Co. v. London Gas Co., 23 L.J.R. 303, 304 (1854) ("How can we
engraft an exception on the statute?"); see also Gibbs v. Guild, 51 L.J.R. 313, 320 (1882) (Holker,
L.J.). Presumably, the legislature believed, "[tjhe Statute of Limitations was intended for the relief
and quiet of defendants, and to prevent persons from being harassed at a distant period of time afler
the committing of the injury complained of." Id. at 391.
Compare Battley v. Faulker, 22 Rev. Rep. 390, 392 (1820) (Abbott, C.J.), "It would be extremely
dangerous to enquire in every particular case, the precise period of time when the damage first came
to the knowledge of the plaintiff, and in many instances it would deprive the party of the benefit
which the Legislature intended to confer upon him" with Lassere v. Lassere, 255 So. 2d 794, 797
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1971) (Regan, J.):
If we could limit our responsibility to achieving substantial justice in the instant case, we
would agree that equity requires relief for the plaintiff-in-rule. However, we can only
resort to equity if our conclusion thereunder does not conflict with/and ultimately do
violence to established jurisprudence.
and with Jaquet v. Webb Levert & Co., 22 La. Ann. 111, 111 (1870) (Wyly, J.):
This court has decided that the doctrine "contra non valentem agere non currit
praescriptio" is merely a rule of equity .... But a rule of equity must yield to express
law, however great the hardship. If the judges were permitted to disregard the law, under
pretext of applying a rule of equity, there would be no certainty either in the law or the
jurisprudence of the State. What would appear to be equity to one set of judges might
not appear to be so to their successors; there would be no fixed rule for the administration
of justice; there would be no certain standard to ascertain the rights of persons. The rights
of individuals would not be measured by the law, but merely by the discretion, the
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codes, common-law judges limited their rule with another: once time begins to
run under a statute of limitations, it does not stop.35 In both systems, however,
the breach between reason and justice only widened.
B. Legem: Vitiorum emendatricem commendatricemque virtutum 56
Civilians and common-law scholars alike concede that prescription and
limitations are as arbitrary3 7 as they are necessary."5 Some have found it
difficult to overstate both the necessity that drives the legislator to prescribe and
the harsh consequences of the legislator's limitations:
Though "praescriptio" was referred to in harsh terms, e.g., its
subject matter was called prejudicial, most odious, most inequitable, and
contrary to justice and equity, and was compared by some authors to
catching eels, it was, nevertheless, adopted for public utility lest
ownership be always uncertain, and was as a result called by Cassidorus
(ca. 490-583) the patroness of the human race. 9
A law, according to Cicero, should reward virtue and punish vice. Cicero
believed, therefore, that doctrina vivendi could be derived from law.' What
principles of living would Cicero see behind civilian prescriptive legislation,
common-law limitations statutes, and our shared desire to evade them?
learning and the conscience of the judge.
55. See, e.g., Doe v. Jones, 2 Rev. Rep. 390, 393 (1791) (Lord Kenyon, C.J.) ("I confess I
never heard it doubted till the discussion of this case, whether, when any of the Statutes of
Limitations had begun to run, a subsequent disability would stop their running.'); see also Rhodes
v. Smethworst, 7 L.J.R. 273, 279 (1838) (Alderson, J.):
It appears that the usual rule is, that if the statute once begins to run, it will continue, that
is to say, that as soon as there is a cause of action, with a plaintiff to sue and a defendant
to be sued, the date is fixed. Much inconvenience would result if it were otherwise; there
would be a great many beginnings and a great many endings to add up, to ascertain
whether the statute had fully run or not. It is far better that there should be a particular
injury to one individual, than a general inconvenience to all persons.
56. (S]ed profecto ita se res habet, ut, quoniam vitiorum emendatricem legem esse oportet
commendatricemque virtutum, ab ea vivendi doctrina ducatur. Cicero, de Legibus i.xxii.58.
57. Pufendorf highlights the arbitrary nature of prescriptive statutes by re-asking the sarcastic
question from Horace of how old a written work must be before it is considered good. See Samuel
Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, in 17 Classics of International Law § 9, at 655 (Oldfather
trans., 1934).
58. Compare Domat, supra note 50, at 869 with Wood, supra note 37, at 6-7 and Benyon v.
Evelyn, 124 Eng. Rep. 614, 634 (1664) (Bridgman, C.J.) ("common repose is more to be favoured
than the private commodity of any single person, be he infant, lunatic, or of any other degree").
Pufendorf disagrees that public necessity must always outweigh individual harm. "Here applies also
the story which Herodotus, ... tells of how, when Themistocles demanded money of the inhabitants
of Andros, with the support of the two most powerful goddesses, 'Persuasion and Necessity,' they
opposed to him even stronger, 'Poverty and Helplessness."' Pufendorf, supra note 57, § 8, at 73.
59. Thomas 0. Martin, Adverse Possession, Prescription and Limitation of Actions 163 (1944).
60. Cicero, de Legibus l.xxii.58.
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Cicero might first ask how the time of death of an action is appointed.
Civilians reply that their legislators engage in a careful balancing of a potential
plaintiffis need for sufficient time to exercise his right against every member of
society's need for security.6 Civilians then justify liberative prescription on
three grounds: presuming payment from the dormancy of the creditor, protecting
the long unsuspecting debtor, and punishing the negligent creditor.6' The
presumption of payment, however, has been heavily criticized and finally
dismissed.63 Instead, the creditor's long delay has persisted as the primary
civilian concern." Common-law judges, achieving the same result with
common sense as that obtained by civilian analysis and tradition,' also justify
statutes of limitations by the creditor's long neglect."
In contrast to the moral tone of this justification, contra non valentem is
usually justified with the cold, analytical notion of potestas. According to
Pufendorf, "[i]f any impossibility is found in a law,. . . it is to be treated as not
61. See Domat, supra note 50, no. 2192, at 870-71; see also Planiol & Ripert, supra note 3,
no. 630, at 346. It is interesting that when this issue is framed in these terms by the common law,
society always prevails against the individual. See, e.g., Benyon, 124 Eng. Rep. at 634.
Because civilians recognize that the same policies drive liberative and acquisitive prescription,
works relating to both will be used interchangeably throughout this article. See Domat, supra note
50, no. 2186, at 868.
62. Pothier, supra note 50, no. 644, at 351. Domat justifies prescription by both a presumption
that the long dormant debt must have been paid and by the creditor's negligence. Domat, supra note
50, no. 2187, at 868, no. 2196, at 872.
63. See Planiol & Riper, supra note 3, no. 691, at 373.
64. See id. no. 632, at 346; see also id. no. 683, at 369 (limiting the presumption of payment
justification to only the shortest prescriptive periods, which are those for which no creditor would
ordinarily delay in collecting). That is not to say, however, that the need to protect the debtor was
similarly discounted. The need to protect the debtor is really inseparable from the creditor's delay
because the debtor is protected from the creditor's delay.
65. A judge may attribute his opinion to common sense. See, e.g., Ecclesiastical Comm'rs v.
North E. Ry., 47 LJ.R. 20, 25 (1877) ("With regard to the Stitute of Limitations, independently of
my decision, I should desire to look at it in a common sense point of view, in a view in which such
things ought to be dealth with."). The similarity to civilian doctrine, however, did not escape
common-law treatise writers. See Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims 608-09 (1864); see
also Wood, supra note 37, at 7 (citing Pothier).
66. See Granger v. George, 29 Rev. Rep. 196, 198 (1826) (Abbott, C.J.) ("The plaintiff was
certainly guilty of laches in not making inquiries respecting the property at an earlier period, and has
no ground of complaint that he is not now entitled to recover."); see also Drewry v. Bames, 27 Rev.
Rep. 20, 23 (1826) ("For, if a party, having a remedy at law, loses it by his own laches, he cannot
come into a court of equity on the ground of his having, by his negligence, lost his legal remedy.").
Of course, common-law judges were also moved by the debtor's difficult burden in proving his
defense against such a stale claim in addition to their concern over the plaintiff's possible laches.
Compare Barber v. Houston, 18 L.R. Ir. 475, 480 (1885) and Battley v. Faulker, 22 Rev. Rep. 390,
394 (1820) with Brookstone v. Smith, 6 L.J.R. 34, 35 (1836) and Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, 9 Rev.
Rep. 119, 120 (1806) ("vigilantibus non dormientibus inservit lex'). Although civilians prefer the
language of impossibility, proof problems were also dear to their hearts. See Planiol & Ripert, supra
note 3, no. 630, at 345.
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binding, or else as warranting a more suitable interpretation."" What drives
civil-law and common-law legislators and judges to respond with contra non
valentem to an impossible prescriptive law? According to Zimmermann, the
response may be unwarranted, at least by reason alone:
Neither logic nor policy compels a legal system to declare contracts, the
performance of which is impossible, as void. It is obvious, of course,
that the impossible performance as such cannot be rendered; but there
is nothing inherently illogical in making a person pay damages for
failure to do what he has undertaken to do."
Reason failing, there must also be a moral undercurrent to potestas to account
for its universal appeal.
Two scholars, Bracton and Gratian, clarify and unify the common and civil
laws of contra non valentem. According to Bracton, liberative prescription is
justified by concern for both defendant's defectum probationis and plaintiff's
negligentiam.69 In Bracton, however, we see the two linked by the implication
that the plaintiff may be more devious than careless, deliberately allowing the
defendant's evidence to erode.7" No doubt that Bracton's view was based upon
Roman rules" but must a court scrutinize the motives of every plaintiff who
67. Pufendorf, supra note 57, § 8, at 73.
68. Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 695-96.
69. Seldon Society, 8 Select Passages from the Works of Bracton and Azo 160-61 (Frederic
W. Maitland ed., 1895).
70. According to Bracton:
Item per exceptionem praescriptionis propter defectum probationis, quia sicut tempus est
modus inducendae obligationis, ita et tollendac per dissimulationem et neglegentiam, et
per consequens actionis quae sub certis temporibus limitatur. (C]urrit enim tempus contra
desides et sui iuris contemptores.
Id. At the least, this seems tantamount to a charge of insincerity. Lord Stowell's doctrine of
insincerity required that suits for nullity of marriage not have any secondary motivation. Lord
Stowell's doctrine was criticized by a Chancellor who upheld a wife's defense of nullity to her
husband's charge of adultery:
She has the most cogent motives for asking a competent court to declare the
truth-motives of an innocent, and to some extent laudable kind. I do not of course mean
to say that it was innocent to place herself as the mother of that child; but being in that
position, it is perfectly innocent to desire that the true character of the relation to the
appellant should be ascertained by law, which depends upon the question whether she is
the appellant's wife or not.
G. v. M., 53 L.T.R. 398, 399-400 (1885).
71. Bracton probably had in mind such Roman rules as, "Non enim neglegentibus subuenitur,
sed necessitate rerum impeditis. [T]otumque istud arbitrio praetoris temperabitur, id est ut ita demum
restituat, si non neglegentia, sed temporis angustia non potuerunt litem contestari." Dig. 4.6.16
(Paul). "Marcellus ait aduersus doli exceptionem non dan replicationem doli. Labeo quoque in
eadem opinione est: ait enim iniquum esse communem malitiam petitori quidem preemio esse, ei
uero, cum quo ageretur, poenae esse, cur longe aequum sit ex eo, quod perfide gestum est, actorem
nihil consequi." Dig. 44.4.4.13 (Ulpian). "Sed et ad eos pertinet, qui conventi frustrantur et qualibet
tergiversatione et sollertia efficiunt, ne cum ipsis agi possit." Dig. 4.6.24 (Paul).
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invokes contra non valentem? How is a judge to evaluate a plaintiffs moral
standing?
Pothier loosened the link between contra non valentem and impossibility.7 2
He noted that if potestas were the issue, the French legislator would have chosen
to suspend prescription against only those minors who were without tutor.
Instead, Pothier concluded that all minors must be the recipients of a special
indulgence granted by society.74 This link between contra non valentem and
special dispensation had first been recognized by Gratian, who had provided two
rationales for clerical contra non valentem.7 First, according to Gratian,
"temporalis praescriptio non obviatur, ubi hostilitatis metus intervenerit.' 6
Gratian justified his rule for clerics by analogy to the dispensation of imperiuni
granted to returning Roman soldiers. 7   Gratian's second variety of clerical
contra non valentem applied ubi furor hostilitatis incumbit78 He needed no
Roman authority for this rule, instead relying on the redemptive powers of his
God.79 Gratian's redemptive justification for contra non valentem, although
noticed by Pothier, has been largely ignored by civilians. By what mechanism
should civilians grasp the process of redemption?
To answer these two questions that lie at the heart of contra non
valentem-to determine the proper measure of a plaintiffs moral standing, and
to find a model for the special dispensation granted by both legislator and
Bracton has been depicted "an able man, but... a poor, an uninstructed Romanist. Let us make
every reasonable concession to [Bracton]. We must judge him by a medieval standard. He did not
live in the age of Savigny; he did not live in the age of Cujas." Select Passages, supra note 69, at
xviii. The author hopes for similar tolerance.
72. See Pothier, supra note 50, nos. 647-50. Although Pothier loosened this link, he did not
break it. He believed that dispensation should be limited to minors because their incapacity lasted
for a relatively short and predictable period of time. Id. no. 648, at 352-53. He argued against
extending special dispensation to persons who were insane or absent. Id. no. 648, at 352-53.
73. Id. no. 647, at 352.
74. Id.
75. Gratian, Decreteun Gratiani Emendatum et Annotationibus Secunda pars, Causa XVI,
Quaestio Il, c. xiii & xiiii (iussu ed. 1601).
76. Id. at c. xiii.
77. According to Gratian:
Sicut enim per legem mundialem is, quos barbarica feritas captiua necessitate transuexit,
postliminio reuertentibus redditur antiqua possessio; non aliter & ecclesia receptura est
parochiam, quam ante tenuit cum rebus suis: siue ab aliis ecclesiis possideatur, siue in
cuiuslibet possessionem trasfusa sit. Non enim erit obiicienda praescriptio temporis, ubi
necessitas iinterest hostilitatis.
Id. Those who glossed Gratian related this passage to the many instances in which Roman law
dispensed with prescription because of a plaintiff's impeded potestas. Id. at n.f. Thus, in the
medieval eyes of Gratian's glossors, impossibility and dispensation had become intertwined.
78. Temporis non currit praescriptio, ubi furor hostilitatis incumbit. Id. at c. xiiii.
79. According to Gratian, "[v]erum si annorum prolixitas in talibus impediat, Deus ipse
reprehendendus est: qui post quadringetos, & triginra annos filios Israel de durissima feruitute
Pharaonis, & fomace ferrea liberauit: sed ipse per se noster redemptor fuit, qui humanum genus post
tot annorum millia de inferni claustris eripuit." Id.
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judge-it is necessary to follow Cicero's exhortation to look beyond the praetor's
edict and into the depths of moral philosophy.
II. NON A PRAETORIS EDICTO, SED INTIMA PHILOSOPHIAso
Moral philosophers dispensed with the plaintiffs neglect as a justification
for prescription altogether."' Instead, they recognized that the true value of a
prescriptive statute is its benefit to the public: "For it is of value to the public
peace that disputes which would run on forever should be finally closed, and that
the dominions of things should not be in continued uncertainty.""2 Despite their
emphasis on the common weal, these were not Marxists; the notion of individual
will reigned supreme in their theories. According to Zimmermann, they bound
impossibility to will with the belief that "ought implies can. "3
In Humanist philosophy, this growing belief in the all important will
engulfed contra non valentem. The presumption of payment became presumed
consent."' Impossibility prevented prescription by vitiating presumed con-
sent."5 Just as had occurred in the law of obligations, legal consequences began
to depend on whether impossibility could be characterized as moral or
physical." According to moral philosophers, the law that requires the perfor-
mance of a physically impossible act is easily dispensed with as an absurdity or
no law at all. 7
In contrast, the morally impossible, although it may be as equally unattain-
able as the physically impossible, may be validly enacted into law without
absurdity. 8 An act is morally impossible when impossibility stems from the
will. 9 By legislating moral impossibilities, a legislator codifies society's moral
aspirations."0 Morally impossible laws, however,, give rise to the need for
dispensing occasional forgiveness. The common-law fraudulent concealment rule
has led an open life as a dispensation; Equity's discretion to prevent the injustice
80. Non ergo a praetoris edicto, ut plerique nunc, neque a duodecim tabulis, ut superiores, sed
penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam iuris disciplinam putas? Cicero, de Legibus L.v.17.
81. Pufendorf, supra note 57, § 2, at 647, § 8, at 653-55.
82. Id.; see also id. § 6, at 651.
83. Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 687. Zimmermann describes how impossibility sufficient
to nullify a contract expanded in scope with the expanding role of the will in moral philosophy. See,
e.g., id. at 693 ("the free will of the promisor can be directed only towards an act or a performance
which is within his (personal) potestas").
84. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, in 4 Classics of International Law § 142, at 156 (Charles
G. Fenwick trans., 1916).
85. Id. § 144, at 158.
86. On moral and physical impossibility in the context of obligations, see Zimmermann, supra
note 21, at 686-97.
87. See Pufendorf, supra note 57, § 8, at 73-74.
88. Id. Pufendorf gives as an entertaining example of moral impossibility living a life so
innocuous that it offends no one. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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of law has long been described as the ruler's "prerogative of grace."'" In fact,
it has been said that Justice had two children, Equity and his sister Grace.92 To
fathom a mechanism for grace, by which Louisiana's own doctrine of contra non
valentem can be understood, it is necessary to probe the ultimate mind of God.
A. Ultimam mentem dei93
A necessary prerequisite for prescription is the lapse of time.9' Civilians
promote the principle that prescription does not extinguish a right, but merely
prevents its enforcement.95 But civilian dogma seems sophistry and illusion
when viewed through moral eyes. For the theologian, time is not simply the
product of a count; time transforms." Prescription resembles a mystical
transformation by which a right ceases to be.97 Transformation, according to
Aquinas, requires incremental movements through time,9 which, once complet-
ed, cannot be altered even through God's omnipotence.9 Moreover, each
movement, for Aquinas, is preceded by another and another, ultimately
91. Billson, supra note 36, at 22, 39-43.
92. Simonds, supra note 25, at 4-5 (quoting Placentinus).
93. Ita principem legem illam et ultimam mentem esse dicebant omnia ratione aut cogentis aut
vetantis dei. Cicero, de Legibus II.iv.8.
94. See, e.g., Code Civil art. 2219 (Fr.). On one occasion in which this lapse may be
presumed, see Douglas Nichols, The Publician Action, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 217, 222-24, 232-34 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Frederick J. Tomkins & Henry D. Jenckin, A Compendium of the Modem Romin
Law 76 (1870). Hence, the persistence of a moral right after prescription has accrued. This
reasoning seems eerily comparable to (and as unsatisfying as) Equity's claim that it could restrain
an individual while leaving a law intact.
96. In the eyes of Aquinas:
Certain things are taken for granted by St. Thomas and the Scholastics in connection with
this problem: time is not something that exists only in our minds (Plotinus), it is not of
the second intention, that is, merely a mode of thought (Descartes and Spinoza), it is not
a subjective form of observation (Kant), but it is something that exists outside the mind.
It is not indeed an independent entity like a river bed in which all other things flow, but
it is a mode of being that modifies changeable things. With Artistotle the concept of time
presupposed the concept of space and the concept of movement.... Time is an accident
of movement.
Hans Meyer, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas 121 (Rev. Frederic Eckhofftrans., 1944). This
notion of time, in which it is inseparable from motion, is named the relational view. 4 Dictionary
of the History of Ideas 390 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1973).
97. Therefore, the canonist, concerned with the sin of bad faith, requires good faith to invoke
liberative prescription, just as he requires it in the context of acquisitive prescription. See Martin,
supra note 59, at 40. This is a lesser variety of good faith, a negative good faith to match the
negative liberative prescription: freedom from responsibility for the accrual of prescription. Id. at
93. This freedom from responsibility is simply another incarnation of the principle of contra non
valentem.
98. Meyer, supra note 96, at 253.
99. Dictionary, supra note 96, at 392. God's inability to reverse what time has accomplished
reminds us of the common-law refusal to suspend a period of limitation once it has begun to run.
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originating with his unmoved God."ro Contra non valentem, as an impediment
to prescriptive transformation, must be understood as breaking a link somewhere
within that divine chain. For the theologian, just as for the civilian or the
common-law lawyer, prescription's weak link is the human will.
For the theologian, the concurrence of intellect, which presents objects to the
will upon which man can act, and will, which moves man to act, is necessary for
an act to be considered voluntary.""' Prescription's transformation will be
broken when a plaintiff's inaction is involuntary. 2 For example, violence can
cause involuntary inaction."03 Aquinas, however, is less charitable toward the
meek, finding that a will that refrains from acting because of fear contains a
mixture of voluntary and involuntariness, which mixture he calls the relatively
involuntary.' 04 For Aquinas, however, only the absolutely involuntary will
suffice to vitiate volition. Thus, we see that Gratian's division of contra non
valentem in two, in which Gratian's furor hostilitas incumbit corresponds to
Aquinas' relative involuntariness, persists in Aquinas' theology. For both
Aquinas and Gratian, this sort of prescriptive chain cannot be broken absent the
grace of God.
Aquinas' absolutely involuntary inaction corresponds to Gratian's metus
hostilitatis intervenerit and to the civilian's impossibility. Clearly, inaction
caused by pure ignorance can be considered absolutely involuntary.' 5
Aquinas, however, is less forgiving of the deliberately ignorant, whose ignorance
he attributed to neglect. '0 Presumably Aquinas would concur with the
common-law judge who requires a plaintiff to have exercised reasonable
100. Meyer, supra note 96, at 255, 268.
101. See I Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica q. vi, art. i, in 19 Great Books of the Western
World 644 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1952); see also Meyer, supra note 96,
at 193-94. According to Aquinas, this judgment requires knowledge of the end, knowledge that it
is an end, and an understanding of the relationship between means and end. Aquinas, supra, q. vi,
art. 2, at 646. In Aquinas's view, other animals are only capable of an imperfectly voluntary act
because they lack either the second or third form of understanding. Id.
102. According to Aquinas, inaction is as voluntary as action when it is accompanied by the will
not to act. Aquinas. supra note 101, q. vi, art. 3, at 647.
103. In a fit of twisted stoicism, Aquinas concluded that violence, although it could not prevent
the will from forming the intent to act, suffices to cause inaction to be classified as involuntary
because violence can prevent execution of that intent. Id. q. vi, art. 2. at 647; see also id. q. vi., art.
5, at 648. Cf. Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 71 So. 598, 600 (La. 1916) ("A defendant, who
has kept a plaintiff in close confinement during the prescriptive period so as to preclude his bringing
suit, could certainly not be allowed to invoke prescription against plaintiff's suit, and thereby reap
the fiuit of his own wrong.").
104. Aquinas, supra note 101, q. vi., art. 6, at 649. Thus, according to Aquinas, there is at least
a little of the necessary concurrence between will and intellect in the act of not acting from fear. Id.
q. vi, art. 6, at 649.
105. Id. q. vi, art. 8, at 651. This type of involuntary inaction, as opposed to that inspired by
fear, is absolute. Id. But cf Hyman, 71 So. at 601 ("at most, [Cox v. Van Ahlefeldt] is authority
only for the proposition that mere ignorance, not brought about or fostered by the machinations of
the party opposing prescription, is no good ground for invoking the maxim, 'contra non valentem").
106. Aquinas, supra note 101, q. vi, art. 8. at 651.
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diligence before allowing Equity's fraudulent concealment exception to break the
statute of limitations' transformative spell. But whether by furor, duress, fear,
violence, or ignorance, the theologian would encourage us to believe that time
will transform a right absent God's grace. To see the mechanism by which
contra non valentem impedes prescription, we must look further into this act of
grace.
1. Homo in tenebris 107
Cicero wondered what evils men might do in the darkness if they did not
share in some portion of the divine spark.' 8 Aquinas less optimistically noted
that even man at his most perfect must be transformed by the grace of God."°
Since no man is free from sin, and death is sin's punishment, a divine death-
sentence is in the nature of man."0 Likewise, no cause of action is so well
made that the legislator's prescription does not await it.
Laws, according to Aquinas, seek the common good, which is why they are
drafted in general language by the community rather than made specifically for
and by the individual."' Aquinas, however, also believed that injury to an
individual was injurious to the commonwealth." 2 He relied on the sovereign
to protect the community when individual injustice might result from applying
a law of the common good:
[I]t happens that a law that is for the common good in the majority of
cases will work injustice in some cases. That law should not be
observed when it is harmful to the general welfare. The executive
branch is the appropriate decider of what the common good is and when
dispensation is appropriate."'
According to Augustine, transformation through grace is the manifestation of
God's love."' What motivates the sovereign? In contrast with God's grace,
which is creative of good, man's grace presupposes some existing good. In fact,
the Louisiana judge appears to closely scrutinize the plaintiff s moral standing
when he dispenses grace in the form of contra non valentem.
107. Nam quid faciet is homo in tenebris, qui nihil timet nisi testem et iudicem? Cicero, de
Legibus I.xiv.41.
108. Cicero doubted that laws would be effective based on their punitive aspects alone without
humanity's natural tendency toward goodness. See id.
109. Meyer, supra note 96, at 512-13.
110. Augustine, The City of God, bk. xiii, ch. 3, in 18 Great Books of the Western World 361
(Marcus Dods trans., 1952). St. Augustine symbolized innate sin and the gift of grace by comparison
to Sarah's barrenness and the gift of Ishmael's birth through the handmaid. Id. bk. xv, ch. 3, at 399.
11. 2 Thomas Aquinas, Treatise on Law q. 90, art. 3, in 20 Great Books of the Western World
207 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1952).
112. Aquinas, supra note 101, q. 21, art. 3, at 719.
113. Aquinas, supra note 111, q. 96, art. 6, at 235.
114. Augustine, supra note 110, bk. vii, ch. 31, at 261-62.
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If love motivates the dispensation of grace, then how can a plaintiff appear
more attractive to the judge? Aquinas, ever concerned with causes, concluded
that the cause of love is the object of love, which must be the good."'
Likewise in Louisiana, the judge describes his favored plaintiff as an innocent
who was lulled into dormancy by the defendant." 6  Louisiana judges are
particularly concerned with innocent children."' The Louisiana plaintiff who
falls short in the judge's eyes finds that prescription has run regardless of actual
potestas. "'
In the final judgment, God, according to Augustine, will sort the good from
the wicked, assuring each of his appropriate reward or punishment."' Augus-
tine claimed that this sorting process requires a greater light than that provided
by our sun, a light no less than the sun of righteousness.' 20 What are the
115. Aquinas, supra note 101, q. 27, art. 2, at 737-38. In contrast, evil can only be loved for
any gain that may accrue as a consequence. Id.
116. See, e.g., Williams v. Red Barn Chem. Inc., 188 So. 2d 78, 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966)
("Plaintiff concludes, evidently from those facts, for no others are alleged, that she was lulled into
a false sense of security, kept in ignorance of her rights and that, thereby, the running of prescription
was suspended under the doctrine of contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio."). Lulling
of an innocent is often a part of the third category of contra non valentem. This language was most
common during the disfavored period of the doctrine, after its Reconstruction Era resurrection and
prior to Corsey. See, e.g., Green v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 144 So. 2d 685, 687 (La. App. 4th
Cit. 1962):
This is an equitable doctrine, formerly denied entry into the law of the State of Louisiana,
but subsequently applied on several occasions with the result that, under certain
circumstances, prescription does not run against a person unable to bring an action. The
rule "contra non valentem" is applied to prevent the injustice of an innocent party being
lulled into a course of inaction in the enforcement of his right by reason of concealment
or fraudulent conduct by defendant, or because of the defendant's failure to perform a
legal duty causing the plaintiff to be kept in ignorance of his rights.
Lulling language, however, remains viable. See, e.g., Miley v. Consolidated Gravity Drainage Dist.
No. 1, 642 So. 2d 693, 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). But see Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections,
375 So. 2d 1319, 1322 n.8 (La. 1979) (criticizing lulling).
117. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Kelley, 641 So. 2d 981, 983 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff was
ten years old when his father cut the signature off his uncle's olographic will). For a brief period
immediately before legislative extension of the prescriptive period for child sexual abuse, abused
children appeared to be the ideal plaintiffs to invoke the doctrine of contra non valentem. See, e.g.,
Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 207 (La. 1994) (child was ten years old when the molestation
ceased); see also La. Civ. Code art. 3496.1 (increasing the prescriptive period for abuse of a minor
to three years from the time the victim attains majority).
Because of the prerequisite of innocence, attorneys are unlikely to receive the dispensation of
contra non valentem. See, e.g., Abbott & Meeks v. de Ia Vergne, 643 So. 2d 827, 829 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1994).
118. See, e.g., Adams v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 644 So. 2d 219, 224 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1994), writ denied, 649 So. 2d 411 (1995).
119. Augustine, supra note 110, bk. xx, ch. 27, at 556. Augustine felt the need to justify the
hardships shared by Christian and Pagan alike after the fall of Rome. See id. bk. 1, ch. 9, at 133-35. He
noted that the Christians were by no means perfect themselves, in particular tending toward excessive
amor mundi. Id. He also suggested the possibility of periodic Job-like tests for the faithful. Id.
120. Augustine, supra note 110, bk. xx, ch. 27, at 556.
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characteristics of the wicked that become apparent in that light? They are the
same as those of the defendant who unsuccessfully invokes prescription,
discerned by the Louisiana appellate judge by the light of the ancient judicial
desire to punish those who would pervert the spirit of the law with its letter.'
2. Foedius, inmanius, contemptius, abiectius 22
Equity must have begun when the very first judicial officer realized that he
had been made a fool. Roman law had contained the equitable principle that no
one benefit from his own fraud through the mechanism of the law. 3 In the
common law, the earliest known use of the writ of deceit was for a court
deceived in 1534 AD. 24 The judiciary is certainly not fond of collaborating
with the deceitful. 12S Louisiana judges invoke contra non valentem when they
feel the alternative is for the legislator to unwillingly reward a fraud. "6
In fact, Louisiana judges inevitably examine the heart of the defendant but
only after a tortured analysis.22 The Louisiana judge begins instead with the
plaintiff, asking whether his ignorance was willful, negligent, or unreasonable.
This question is answered in light of the knowledge imputed to a generic
reasonable plaintiff. To determine whether the reasonable plaintiff would have
remained inactive under the circumstances of the case, however, the court
suddenly asks the defendant whether he attempted to mislead or impede this
plaintiff, or whether he concealed information. Reptational reasoning is the
inevitable product of the judicial juristic method.'28 At its core is the insight,
121. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 215 (La. 1994); see also Bouterie v. Crane,
616 So. 2d 657, 657 (La. 1993).
122. Quid enim foedius avaritia, quid inmanius libidine, quid contemptius timiditate, quid
abiectius tarditate et stultitia dici potest? Cicero, de Legibus l.xix.51.
123. Dig. 44.4.1.1 (Paul): "Ideo autern hanc exceptionem practor proposuit, ne cui dolus suus
per occassionem iuris ciuilis contra naturalem aequitatem prosit."
124. Billson, supra note 36, at 144.
125. See, e.g., Hyman v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 139 La. 411, 417-18, 71 So. 598, 600
(1916).
126. See, e.g., Plaquemine Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co., 502 So. 2d 1034, 1055-56(La. 1987); see also Hyman, 139 La. at 41I, 71 So. at 606 (O'Niell, J., dissenting) ("No law was ever
enacted which contemplated the defeat of its purpose by fraud, and no court was ever organized
which would knowingly permit a litigant to profit by his own wrong."). On Chief Justice O'Niell
and his dissents, see Katherine L. Brash, Chief Justice O'Niell and the Louisiana Civil Code-The
Influence of His Dissents, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 436 (1945).
127. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Schumpert Medical Cir., 641 So. 2d 1016, 1020 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 648 So. 2d 401 (1994); see also Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 625 So. 2d 222, 226-27 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 631 So. 2d 445 (1994); Maung-U v. May, 556 So. 2d 221, 225 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1385 (1990). But see Crosby v. Keys, 590 So. 2d 601, 603(La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 593 So. 2d 373 (1992) (refusing to scrutinize defendant's moral
standing because prescription is not an equitable doctrine).
128. We may be admonished that "[first, Morality is not a source of law." Tomkins & Jenckin,
supra note 95, at 37. And common lawyers may boast that "in our days Equity has become a
science founded upon the reasonings and experience of the past." Id. at 38. But the common law
[Vol. 56
DOUGLAS NICHOLS
however, that in comparison to a plaintiff, and in light of all circumstances, a
defendant's nature is best illuminated.'"
Aquinas found evil to be the cause of hatred, just as good naturally draws
love.'30 However, hate can only exist, according to Aquinas, if preceded by
love; nothing is hated unless it is baneful to a thing beloved.' In contrast,
Augustine believed that, because he considered evil a defect rather than a
positive quality, it is as futile to look for evil's cause as it is to listen for
silence.'32 Although he found the cause of sin unfathomable, Augustine was
able to provide exacerbating factors. 33 For example, Augustine found the
most easily avoided sin to be the worst.34 The Louisiana judge combines the
Thomist and Augustinian traditions after translating the easily avoided sin into
the incomprehensible sin. Hence, a sin so outside the norm, so odious, and
perpetrated against an innocent, such as the sin of child molestation, was fertile
ground for the doctrine of contra non valentem. 13' The Louisiana judge prefers
to invoke contra non valentem against the defendant that Cicero might describe
as more filthy, more horrible, more despised, and more mean.
B. Lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus 136
If Cicero is correct that man and God share reason and law, then we ought
to be able to reduce the principles of the divine prerogative of grace to a
workable rule for contra non valentem. In doing so, potestas must be avoid-
ed.' Reliance on potestas produces extreme results, often requiring that a
also contains criticism of precedential accretion:
It is, in my opinion, unfortunate that when an expression is used by a judge, however
eminent, in explaining his view of a particular case, and the principles on which it ought
to be dealt with, if that expression was not previously a vox signara, or a technical term
of law, it should be taken up by other judges as if it had either established or recognized
a technical rule which did not otherwise exist.
G. v. M., 53 L.T.R. 398, 399 (1985).
129. Cf Whitnell v. Menville, 540 So. 2d 304, 308 (La. 1989).
130. Aquinas, supra note 101, q. 29, art. 1, at 745.
131. Id. q. 29, art. 2, at 745-46.
132. Augustine, supra note 110, bk. xii, ch. 7, at 346.
133. Id. bk. xiv, ch. 12-14, at 387-88.
134. Id. bk. xiv, ch. 12, at 387. Hence, Adam and Eve's inability to avoid the forbidden fruit
in the Garden of Eden was, according to Augustine, quite heinous. Id. Augustine also found that
sin is made worse by blaming someone else when caught. Id. bk. xiv, ch. 14, at 388. Thus, when
Adam blamed Eve, and Eve blamed the Serpent, they sealed their fate. Id. Likewise, the Louisiana
judge has little sympathy for the defendant whose only defense is the plaintiff's laches.
135. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Gatch, 635 So. 2d 206, 212-17 (La. 1994); see also Bouterie v.
Crane, 616 So. 2d 657, 658-59 (La. 1993); Held v. State Farm Ins. Co., 610 So. 2d 1017, 1019-20
(La. App. ist Cir. 1992), writ denied, 613 So. 2d 975 (1993).
136. Est igitur, quoniam nihil est ratione melius eaque est et in homine et in deo, prima homini
cum deo rationis societas; inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem efiam recta ratio communis est; quae
cum sit lex lege quoque consociati homines cum dis putandi sumus. Cicero, de Legibus .vii.23.
137. Misplaced reliance on potestas contributed to the judicary's initial refusal to extend contra
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plaintiff be comatose before attracting judicial sympathy. 38 Instead of abstract
potestas, guidance should be gleaned by comparison to other civilian systems.
In modem civilian systems, as well as in Louisiana, prescription is the rule
rather than the exception. Civilians tend to except prescription with general
non valentem to the victims of abuse. See, e.g., Fontaine v. Roman Catholic Church, 625 So. 2d 548,553 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 630 So. 2d 787 (1994); see also Laughlin v. Breaux, 515So. 2d 480, 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987) ("We find that [the learned helplessness of a battered
woman] is not, of itself, sufficient to interrupt prescription under contra non valentem."); Crosby v.Keys, 590 So. 2d 601, 602 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991), writ denied, 593 So. 2d 373 (1992) ("Eventhough the alleged sexual abuse may have caused psychological injury, contra non valentem should
not be applied where there is no evidence that the defendants took any action to prevent the plaintiffs
from filing suit."). Particularly shameful invocations of potestas appear in Landreneau v. Fruge, 598
So. 2d 658, 662 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992):
We note that in the present case Capucine lived at home and thus had ample opportunity
to confide in and seek help from her mother. While she may have been hesitant to
discuss sexually deviant conduct with her mother, we cannot say that such hesitancy and
the avoidance of the subject gave rise to the requisite level of incapacity necessary to
invoke the rule of contra non valentem.
and Bock v. Harmon, 526 So. 2d 292, 296-97 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 275 (1988):Any psychological block which Fred may have had about bringing a civil action against
his father cannot really be compared to the organic brain damage suffered by the plaintiff
in Corsey....
Fred was fully aware of the illegality and perverse nature of the things his father did.His failure to file suit was due to a number of factors, including embarrassment, fear of
ridicule, a distorted view of his father's power and accountability for his actions, as well
as a general ignorance of his legal remedies as an injured party. We do not mean todeprecate the psychological trauma Fred was experiencing but we are unable to apply the
"exceptional" doctrine of contra non valentem to the facts of this case.
In defense of these judges, see Smith v. Stewart, 21 La. Ann. 67, 76 (1869):
And so long as courts continue to act under the notion, that their equity powers authorize
them to correct, control, moderate or supersede the law, with the view of enforcing rights
which are just, great uncertainty and confusion will ensue; and as Mr. Justice Blackstone
says, courts of equity "will rise above all laws, either common or statute, and be most
arbitrary legislators in every particular case."
138. See, e.g., Harsh v. Calogero, 615 So. 2d 420, 422-23 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993):
In other words, due to the tortious conduct of the defendant, the plaintiff was placed into
a mental stupor in which he could not understand anything much less the facts
surrounding his injury. This state of mind would be analogous to total amnesia or beingin a coma. Thus, the rule simply stated is if the defendant's tortious conduct causes theplaintiff to be in such a condition that he cannot even understand the facts which
surrounded his injury, then prescription will not being to run until the condition subsides.
This severe state of mental incapacity is the threshold set by the Supreme Court in order
for the doctrine of contra non valentem to apply in situations such as this.Applying this principle to the case before us, clearly, the action is prescribed. Theplaintiff was in a coma for two weeks. During this period prescription was suspended.
During approximately the next four weeks the plaintiff was still in such a mental stupor
that she could not even remember the facts surrounding her accident. During this periodprescription was suspended. However, once the plaintiff regained such faculties so as to
be able to recall the facts surrounding her accident, prescription commenced.
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rules, which immediately follow the establishment of prescription in a civil
code. 3' In Louisiana, however, there is also a Roman tendency to establish
nearly nominate varieties of contra non valentem within individual articles."4
Given that both prescriptive periods' 4' and their causes for suspension4 2 are
inherently factually dependent, this trend seems appropriate. But once a general
principle of contra non valentem is codified, it will be necessary to coordinate
the interaction between the general and the specific. To these ends, I propose
retaining Civil Code article 3467 but with the following revision to its infamous
comment d:
Article 3467. Persons against whom prescription runs.
Prescription runs against all persons unless exception is established
by legislation.
43
Comment d (PROPOSED).
Prescription runs against absent persons and incompetents, including
minors and interdicts, unless exception is established by legislation."
Exception to prescription may be established generally, such as in
the articles that follow. Exception may also be provided elsewhere,
such as where the cause of action is granted. Because of the fact-
intensive process of excepting prescription, and consistent with general
civilian principles of interpretation, the general formulation always must
yield to the specific.
Exception must, however, be established by legislation. Therefore,
the judicial doctrine of contra non valentem is no longer relevant except
to the extent it is codified in the following articles.
It has been suggested that the discovery rule is not useful in a civilian
system because the legislator allows sufficient time for discovery when
establishing a prescriptive period.' 4' Louisiana's extraordinarily short prescrip-
tive period for delict, however, borders on what Pufendorf might feel obligated
to disregard as a legal absurdity. 46 In the absence of a reasonable prescriptive
139. See, e.g., Code civil arts. 2219, 2251-2253, 2257 (Fr.).
140. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 189.
141. As the probatio becomes more diabolica, the prescriptive period should decrease. See J.E.
deBecker, I The Principles & Practice of the Civil Code of Japan 132-33 (1921).
142. See, e.g., Nathan v. Carter, 372 So. 2d 560, 562 (La. 1979).
143. La. Civ. Code art. 3467.
144. Taken verbatim from La. Civ. Code art. 3468. Presumably, if Article 3467 is to be taken
seriously, then Article 3468 would be unnecessary and should be repealed.
145. Compare Favrot, supra note 9, at 253-54 with Barber v. Houston, 18 L.R. Ir. 475, 480
(1885).
146. Compare Whitnell v. Silverman, 646 So. 2d 989, 992-93 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994) (listing
diseases unlikely to be discovered before three years); LeBlanc v. Meza, 620 So. 2d 521, 523 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1993), writ denied, 639 So. 2d 1176, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 514 (1994). It has been
suggested that the short prescriptive period for delict was what necessitated the grafting of the
discovery rule onto contra non valentem in the first place. See Patrick D. Gallaugher Jr., Revision
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period for delict, the discovery rule must be codified. Following the example of
the legislator,"' and to lessen the liberality of codified discovery, I have
chosen to couple this codification with an outside peremptive limit based upon
statutes of limitations of other American jurisdictions. The discovery article
would read as follows:
Article 3492 (PROPOSED). Delictual actions.
Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of one
year."8 This prescription does not begin to run until the delictual
action has accrued. An undiscovered delictual action cannot accrue
until it is reasonably knowable. A person is deemed to know what he
could by reasonable diligence have learned.
After five years from the day injury or damage is sustained, even
an undiscovered delictual action is barred by peremption unless
exception is established by legislation.
Comment a (PROPOSED).
The first sentence of this Article reproduces the substance of Article
3536(1) ... of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870.1'9 The remainder
codifies the discovery rule with the addition of a peremptive period.
Whether the cause of action could have been discovered with reasonable
diligence is evaluated in light of all relevant circumstances, including
any act by the defendant to conceal the cause of action or hinder the
plaintiff.
The general peremptive period may be altered or dispensed with by
specific legislation. There is, however, no room for judicial exception.
Comment e (PROPOSED).
This prescriptive period does not run against minors or interdicts in
actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the
Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability
actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.'s5
Civilians agree that vis major is an appropriate ground for suspension of
prescription."' Civilians also tend to suspend prescription for the duration of
special relationships,15 2 even when these relationships do not result in the legal
incapacity to sue one another.' In Louisiana, contra non valentem is invoked
of the Civil Code Provisions on Liberative Prescription, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 379, 386-87 (1985).
147. See, e.g.. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1994).
148. Taken verbatim from La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
149. Taken verbatim from La. Civ. Code art. 3492 cmt. a.
150. Taken almost verbatim from the last sentence of La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
151. See, e.g., Greek Civil Code art. 255.
152. See, e.g., Code civil arts. 2219, 2251-2253, 2257 (Fr.); see also Codice civile arts. 2934-
2935, 2941-2942 (Italy); Greek Civil Code arts. 247, 251, 255-256, 258.
153. For example, suspension during marriage was retained in the German Civil Code when
spousal immunity was abolished. Retention was justified by concerns for family harmony. See 2
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by the judge to suspend prescription in legislatively unforeseen circumstances.
Our judges, who are naturally ill at ease with this contra legem role,"' have
relied inordinately on precedent to restrict contra non valentem to an antiquated
set of categories. To restore judicial flexibility' and to place the Louisiana
judge at ease, I propose that judicial contra non valentem be codified"6 in the
following article on suspension:
Article 3469 (PROPOSED). Suspension of prescription.
Prescription is suspended between spouses during marriage,
caretakers and children during minority, tutors and minors during
tutorship, and curators and interdicts during interdiction.'
Prescription is also suspended by legal moratorium or vis major that
occurs within the last six months of the prescriptive period."'
Prescription may be suspended under extraordinary circumstances
for good cause unless prohibited by law.
Comment (PROPOSED).
A caretaker means a person legally obligated to provide or secure
adequate care for a child, including a tutor, guardian, legal custodian,
or parent."9
Legal moratorium includes occasions on which courts are made
inaccessible by war, legislative order, or judicial refusal to act. To
obtain the benefit of suspension, either legal moratorium or vis major
must have occurred, at least in part, during what would have been the
last six months of the original, unsuspended prescriptive period.
This article replaces the judicial doctrine of contra non valentem
with a legislative grant of the discretion to suspend prescription to
prevent obvious injustice. Courts should avoid reliance on precedent in
performing such an inherently fact-intensive and equitable role.
Milnchener Kommentar zum BGB, -Feldman, 3.Auflage, Allgemeiner Teil, § 204, annot. 1.
154. See, e.g., La Plaque Corp. v. Chevron USA Inc., 638 So. 2d 354, 356 (La. App. 4th Cir.),
writ denied, 644 So. 2d 395 (1994) ("Contra non valentem is an exceptional remedy recognized by
our jurisprudence which is in direct contradiction to the articles in the Civil Code and therefore
should be strictly construed.").
155. It has already been suggested that contra non valentem, as an equitable doctrine, ought not
be straitJacketed in precedential categories, but rather should be applied whenever warranted by
exceptional circumstances. Hackenberg, supra note 3, at 830.
156. According to Symeonides, the Law Institute rejected one attempt to codify contra non
valentem, which would have appeared as a second paragraph to Civil Code art. 3467:
Liberative prescription is exceptionally suspended when the filing or prosecution of a suit
is prevented by the fraud of the creditor or is made impossible by extraordinary
circumstances totally beyond the control of the plaintiff, and the accrual of prescription
would result in obvious injustice.
See Symeonides, supra note 2, at 139 n.109 (quoting proposal to the Law Institute of Feb. 19, 1982).
157. Taken almost verbatim from the first paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 3469.
158. Adapted from Greek Civil Code art. 255.
159. Adapted from the second paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 3469.
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Ill. NEQUE CUM LITTERiS AUT ORIATUR AUT OCCIDAT60
The Louisiana judge, like the Roman praetor, bridged the gap between the
utilitas and ius of prescriptive legislation with a Latin gloss. But stoic universals
such as good faith, exceptional circumstances, and good cause are the proper
building blocks of the judicial juristic method.' 6' In their absence, the judge
becomes mired in precedential accretion. Disingenuous codification only adds
to the muck. Injustice inevitably takes root. In the absence of genuine
revolutionary sentiment in Louisiana, it might be time to allow the Louisianajudge to be iudex, and to require the Louisiana legislator, under the tutelage of
the Louisiana Law Institute, to become praetor. The alternative is to continue
to deny what Cicero knew, that the law neither begins nor ends with codification.
160. Adsentior, frater, ut, quod est recte verumque aetemrnum quoque sit neque cun litteris,quibus scita scribuntur, aut oriatur aut occidat. Cicero, de Legibus ll.iv.l I.161. For a demonstration of the proper judicial juristic method, see Zimmermann's discussion
of the use made of "factum sit neque fiat" in the exceptio doli by the Roman iudex. See
Zimmermann, supra note 21, at 667-68. Asking what has become of the jurist, see John P. Dawson,
The Oracles of the Law 100-47 (1968).
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